Jersey could have adopted a proportional‑plus‑volume‑discount model because nothing in its freight system prevents it. The island’s supply chain is dominated by Ro‑Ro traffic, predictable supermarket flows, and a small number of high‑volume importers.
These are exactly the conditions under which tiered commercial pricing works well. A structure that charges proportionally for lane‑metres while offering rebates for committed volumes is entirely compatible with Jersey’s vessels, ports, and operational patterns.
DFDS offers a broad freight network across northern Europe, with routes covering the North Sea, the Baltic, and Scandinavia. For frequent freight drivers, DFDS runs schemes such as the RoadKings Freight Drivers Club, which provide route‑based discounts and benefits linked to the number of crossings over a set period.
Commercial customers can obtain negotiated tariffs and make use of DFDS’s wider logistics and ferry network to coordinate movements across multiple regions. This makes DFDS a strong option for companies that value a single operator with extensive coverage and the ability to support regular, cross‑regional freight flows.
In other words, DFDS is fully accustomed to operating within a tiered, incentive‑based pricing framework.
So from a regulatory perspective, Jersey had several viable options. It could have required DFDS to publish a banded tariff, mandated a regulated framework for volume‑linked rebates, or allowed commercial contracts while ensuring oversight and transparency. All of these approaches are used in other Ro‑Ro markets, including those with similar scale and dependency profiles.
The island’s government opted instead for a single flat rate, prioritising simplicity and transparency over differentiated pricing, where a base rate would be published but discounted bands would be negotiated and commercially sensitive between parties.
The policy choice Jersey made was therefore not dictated by technical or commercial constraints. A hybrid model combining proportional charges with volume‑based incentives was entirely possible, entirely normal in the sector, and entirely within the government’s power to require. Jersey simply chose a different path.
DFDS offers a broad freight network across northern Europe, with routes covering the North Sea, the Baltic, and Scandinavia. For frequent freight drivers, DFDS runs schemes such as the RoadKings Freight Drivers Club, which provide route‑based discounts and benefits linked to the number of crossings over a set period.
Commercial customers can obtain negotiated tariffs and make use of DFDS’s wider logistics and ferry network to coordinate movements across multiple regions. This makes DFDS a strong option for companies that value a single operator with extensive coverage and the ability to support regular, cross‑regional freight flows.
In other words, DFDS is fully accustomed to operating within a tiered, incentive‑based pricing framework.
So from a regulatory perspective, Jersey had several viable options. It could have required DFDS to publish a banded tariff, mandated a regulated framework for volume‑linked rebates, or allowed commercial contracts while ensuring oversight and transparency. All of these approaches are used in other Ro‑Ro markets, including those with similar scale and dependency profiles.
The island’s government opted instead for a single flat rate, prioritising simplicity and transparency over differentiated pricing, where a base rate would be published but discounted bands would be negotiated and commercially sensitive between parties.
The policy choice Jersey made was therefore not dictated by technical or commercial constraints. A hybrid model combining proportional charges with volume‑based incentives was entirely possible, entirely normal in the sector, and entirely within the government’s power to require. Jersey simply chose a different path.
Which is probably why Deputy Morel doesn't want too close a look at alternative paths he could have taken in negotiations. And why we have to pay the price - literally!