I've just reading Sam Mezec's latest blog. I would note that he puts a good case in numbers for Option A, and larger districts.
http://sammezec.blogspot.com/2013/01/reform-option-deputies-for-states.html
However, several submissions to the Commission did also put a very good case for versions of Clothier, smaller districts but with voter parity. Some people think that losing the Islandwide mandate is also something not to be taken lightly; ask Lyndon Farnham for his views, or my mother, for that matter! Others think that you cannot simply play a numbers game without respecting the heritage of the Island, and that Constables can supply an important and very different voice to the States. So I'm not that swayed by the rhetorical flourish which says:
"It is a clear choice between one democratic option and two undemocratic options."
"The Only Democratic Option"
Now Sam does a good job of arguing the case for Option A, but that's the only one he looks for positive arguments for, so not unnaturally, he finds them. I am sure that there will be supporters for Option B and Option C, and they will think they have positive arguments for their case, and against Option A. Some of those can already be seen in the submissions to the Commission, others may be forthcoming.
What I contend is that we cannot prejudge the vote by saying that one option is "more democratic" than another as a proven fact. An argument is not like a proof in mathematics, which is either valid or not, or a scientific theory which can be falsified. It's a means of persuasion, of mustering facts to support a particular position, and while some arguments may appear more compelling or persuasive to me, they may not be so to another individual. What is blindingly obvious to Mr Smith is wrong to Mr Jones, and it doesn't matter what the numbers say, he knows how they can be manipulated. In short, people don't just argue like calculating machines, as a Council of Vulcans, applying cold logic. There are all sorts of other factors which come into a decision, not least because we are flesh and blood and have feelings.
Rationality and cold logic brought in the metric system, built solidly about base 10, the attempt to bring order to time with "decimal time" failed, despite several attempts to introduce it. Spelling reform left a legacy in which many American spellings are phonetic unlike English counterparts, but the fervent attempts to complete the task failed. There are very few Esperanto speakers in the world, yet it was devised as a model language, a child of reason and the enlightenment. That's why numbers don't always provide the whole picture; people make decisions on other factors, as no doubt we will see in the voting, and is clear from the submissions, most of which say all kinds of differing things.
And even the most basic of assumptions can be questioned, for instance:
"If you accept the objectives tests of democracy (equality, representation and choice) then Option A, 42 Deputies in 6 super-constituencies, is the only option on the table that meets all the criteria. It is simple, clear and fair."
For the ancient Greeks of Athens, democracy was something which gave each citizen an equal vote. An Athenian citizen at the time of Pericles may well be horrified with the idea of representation. In his novel "October The First is Too Late", Fred Hoyle puts this very neatly:
Our hosts were concerned with the structure of the seas beyond the Pillars of Hercules, with what we believed about the nature of the world. How was our political life organized? They didn't like the idea of elected representatives of the people. To them it was important that every free adult member of the community should be permitted to vote on every specific issue. It was impossible to explain that the very size of our population precluded their own democratic system. Morgan pointed out that our people were scattered in many cities, that it was impossible for them to be constantly travelling in order to discuss things together. It was essential for each city to appoint its own representatives and for the representatives of all the cities to confer together. I was surprised and rather alarmed by the serious, chilled manner in which this was received. (1)
While the Greek system - often called "direct democracy" excluded slaves and women from political participation, all citizens debated and voted on every issue. Pericles noted how all citizens took part, not at one stage removed, but directly:
Our political system does not compete with with institutions which are elsewhere in force. We do not copy our neighbors, but try to be an example. Our administration favors the many instead of the few: this is why it is called a democracy.
An Athenian citizen does not neglect public affairs when attending to his private business.... We consider a man who takes no interest in the state not as harmless, but as useless; and although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it.(6)
Today in most countries, democracy means electing representatives to debate and vote for you and me, and it is not the case, as with Athenian democracy that "we are all able to judge a policy" and whether that detachment from the actual voter leads to a better system is debatable. For the Ancient Greeks, modern "representative democracy" would be a process by which the people are disempowered to govern the society they live in. Others do it for them.
Cecil Chesterton was inclined to think this system was not good, and could be manipulated - "The Party System" which he wrote with Hilaire Belloc is an attempt to show this. Their theme was that "Votes and elections and representative assemblies are not democracy ; they are at best machinery for carrying out democracy." and they argued that the system of political parties was a sham, whichever party was in power worked for vested interests, not the people who elected them. That was because they argued that with a Party system, in practice no candidate can run with much of a chance of getting elected without their sanction. And when they were writing, around 1911, what they could see was two Parties with very similar agenda, so that the voter's choice was severely limited. For them, the Parties had effectively stitched up the public, so that Party Politics was the most undemocratic way of people having their say. Looking at the coupon elections, and the later National Government under Macdonald and then Baldwin, it certainly seems they had a point. Even today, with manifesto "promises", it is still very much like choosing between two set menus, always with the possibility that the chef will tell you a particular course is not available, and you will have to settle for a replacement.
And as G.K. Chesterton himself pointed out in a letter about the UK's system of representative democracy, "I say our representatives accept designs and desires almost entirely from the Cabinet class above them; and practically not at all from the constituents below them. I say the people does not wield a Parliament which wields a Cabinet. I say the Cabinet bullies a timid Parliament which bullies a bewildered people. Is that plain?" It is that deflection by the disadvantage of representation, which is the weakness of that system over Athenian democracy, where "only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it".
I think that while it is probably the only workable system with large numbers of people, a point made by Fred Hoyle, it doesn't mean that it is not defective in all kinds of ways, as can be seen above. So I'd question whether Sam can say that "representation" is an objective test of democracy. You may have candidates standing none of which you wish to vote for, or believe could adequately represent you, which is where the campaign to have NOTA (None of the Above) on voting slips comes from, addressing what they see as a marked deficiency - the inability to have that choice counted.
Arguments can be mustered for and against any option, and a good philosopher would do just that. It is one of the areas where Richard Dawkins fell out with Michael Ruse. For Dawkins, atheism was the only answer, and it is important to argue against what he perceived to be "the enemies of reason", but Ruse, as a philosopher, was prepared to argue different points of view, even ones he did not personally believe in:
I, like Dawkins, am a non-believer. Yet I, like Williams, refuse to put science and religion at war. This is partly because I do not think they have to be - I see them as asking different questions. But it is also because I think there is something socially and psychologically unhealthy about the course that the debate has taken, especially by those on my side of the fence. I do not think the faults are all on one side, but let me speak to the side to which I might naturally be expected to belong.
There are many aspects of religion that I find really offensive, celibate old men in skirts telling young women how to run their private lives being one. Not all scientists are keen on authority; plenty would say that the best thing about science is that it is anti-authoritarian. Nonetheless, when scientists start talking about values, they often find it hard to resist the temptations of moralising and authoritarianism. (2)
It's that which I find debatable about Sam's approach. There's a certainty about it. It is the right option, and if you can't see that, it is because of ideological blinkers. The argument is clear cut, and irrefutable. But not everyone accepts Sam's axioms about what he considers "objective tests of democracy". I don't think it is such a "clear choice"; it is to him and his supporters, it plainly is not to everyone.
For Karl Popper, for example, democracy mean the ability of the people to remove political leaders they did not want and replace them without bloodshed; it is very much a minimalist idea. for him, the vital question is not 'Who should rule?' but 'How can we minimize misrule?"
For we may distinguish two main types of government. The first type consists of governments of which we can get rid of without bloodshed - for example, by way of general elections; that is to say, the social institutions provide means by which the rulers may be dismissed by the ruled, and the social traditions ensure that these institutions will not easily be destroyed by those who are in power. The second type consists of governments which the ruled cannot get rid of except by way of a successful revolution - that is to say, in most cases, not at all. I suggest the term 'democracy' as a short-hand label for a government of the first type, and the term 'tyranny' or 'dictatorship'; for the second. This, I believe, corresponds closely to traditional usage.
Seen in this light, the theory of democracy is not based upon the principle that the majority should rule; rather, the various equalitarian methods of democratic control, such as democratic elections and representative government, are to be considered as no more than well-tried and, in the presence of a widespread traditional distrust of tyranny, reasonable effective institutional safe-guards against tyranny, always open to improvement, and even providing methods for their own improvement. (3)
C.S. Lewis had a similar notion of democracy. It was the best of bad options, because, as with Popper, the question was not "Who should rule?" but how can we prevent misrule:
I am a democrat [proponent of democracy] because I believe in the Fall of Man. I think most people are democrats for the opposite reason. A great deal of democratic enthusiasm descends from the ideas of people like Rousseau, who believed in democracy because they thought mankind so wise and good that every one deserved a share in the government. The danger of defending democracy on those grounds is that they're not true. . . . I find that they're not true without looking further than myself. I don't deserve a share in governing a hen-roost. Much less a nation. . . . The real reason for democracy is just the reverse. Mankind is so fallen that no man can be trusted with unchecked power over his fellows. (5)
The word "democracy", as Orwell noted, is a shifting one, capable of many uses, and many definitions, all of which are used to legitimise kind of government - "In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using that word if it were tied down to any one meaning."
A perusal of the Isle of Man, the Swiss Cantons, the USA, the UK, and the European Parliament shows that there are certainly many kinds of representative democracy. All have their supporters, and there are people who will argue strongly in favour of first past the post as there are those who want some kind of proportional representation.
The mathematical treatment of voting systems, as New Scientist showed (an article by mathematician Ian Stewart in 2010), was that they all had their deficiencies, although of course those are generally glossed over by their supporters. Kenneth Arrow actually used mathematics to prove that no voting system can be perfect. In Jersey, this can be seen in the varying arguments in the submission to the Commission's website, and there are those who think that Option A, losing an Island wide mandate (which some want to be increased) is not a good way to go. Clothier, as is well known, favoured removal of Constables and Senators, and adjusting numbers among the existing Parishes and districts.
So in short, the one thing about a "clear choice" is that it is not clear. There is no unanimity in it. And there is nothing reprehensible about taking a different point of view, and going for Option B or Option C, or even spoiling the paper or not voting because you don't like any of the options available. For some people, it is being told "take a card", and the card trick uses the fact that only the suit of clubs is available. There should not be any presumption that somehow supporters of Option A have the truth and that those who do not are lesser beings, perhaps even somewhat shifty or immoral.
In fact returning to what has been said:
"It is a clear choice between one democratic option and two undemocratic options."
"The Only Democratic Option"
In fact, the real democratic option is to give the people the ability to choose - a Referendum. That is the one democratic option, and whichever option comes out as that chosen, no one can see it is not "Vox Populi", the people of Jersey will have spoken. It may well be a result that the supporters of Option A do not like. It may be an option that I do not like. But it is the democratic option, in a very real sense of direct democracy, of actually letting the citizens decide, just as the Athenians did.
Perhaps I am naive, but like G.K. Chesterton, I tend to think that the instinct of the people is probably better than intellectuals. I'm prepared to put my trust in the commonsense of the ordinary man or woman, and let them decide what is the democratic option, rather than prejudge it. By all means let's argue the Options, but let's not say that our own choice is "democratic" and the others are "undemocratic" until after the vote is counted.
If there is one class of men whom history has proved especially and supremely capable of going quite wrong in all directions, it is the class of highly intellectual men. I would always prefer to go by the bulk of humanity; that is why I am a democrat. (4)
Links(1) http://scilib-fiction.narod.ru/Hoyle/October1/index.html
(2) http://www.aeonmagazine.com/world-views/michael-ruse-humanism-religion/
(3) http://lachlan.bluehaze.com.au/books/popper_open_society_vol1.html
(4) http://www.gutenberg.org/files/11505/11505-h/11505-h.htm
(5) Present Concerns, C.S. Lewis
(6) http://www.dcn.davis.ca.us/~sander/mensa/popper1.html
(7) http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20627581.400-electoral-dysfunction-why-democracy-is-always-unfair.html
(8) http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d11a/d1123-r3.pdf
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