The Locust Years

Jim Hacker: There's a vacancy for Deputy Secretary here. I shall appoint a woman. Sarah Harrison.

Sir Humphrey: The point is she's too young and it's not her turn.

Jim Hacker: I knew you'd say that! This is exactly what's wrong with the Civil Service - Buggins' turn! The best people should be promoted!

Sir Humphrey: Exactly! As soon as it's their turn!

Jim Hacker: Oh, nonsense! Napoleon ruled Europe when he was in his 30s! Alexander conquered the world in his 20s.

Sir Humphrey: They'd have made poor Deputy Secretaries.

Jim Hacker: They didn't wait their turn!

Sir Humphrey: And look what happened to them.

Jim Hacker: And look what's happened to us! Instead of being run by a lot of young, able, energetic men, this country's being run by tired, cynical 55-year-olds who just want a quiet life!

Sir Humphrey: Had you anyone specific in mind?

- Yes Minister

Listening to Charlie Parker passionately advocate change, everything he says is pretty accurate in the way the top echelons of the civil service work.

"The Chief Executive was nominally accountable for the public service, but had no actual authority over the departmental Chief Officers, as a result of the then corporate sole arrangements. Departments were fiefdoms in law, with a siloed mentality, which meant that there was no shared ambition, no shared accountability, no collective responsibility and little cross-cutting activity."

Finance was said to be a particular area of concern, following a review led by a finance consultant within his Transition Team. “This uncovered some systemic weaknesses, poor practices and a range of risks,” he reported.

“Departments were fiefdoms in law, with a siloed mentality, which meant that there was no shared ambition, no shared accountability, no collective responsibility and little cross-cutting activity. ‘This was not only a barrier to effective planning and decision-making for the public service, but it led to wasteful duplication, inconsistency and competition between departments.”

So why had nothing taken place under the two previous Chief Executives of the States?

Bill Ogley was brought in as someone with expertise in managing change, just as Ministerial government was coming in, and the mantra, as we heard so often, was that there was to be a new era of “joined up government”. In 2004,. Everything seemed positive. As the JEP reported at the time:

“The results of a month-long exercise by senior civil servants on the future of States departments are being made known to workers and politicians and will be made public on Wednesday. The 'visioning' exercise has been led by the corporate management board under the leadership of Policy and Resources chief executive Bill Ogley. P & R president Senator Frank Walker has promised that the results will signal 'a revolution' in the way that the public sector operates.Fifteen civil service managers were seconded from their jobs to work on the report for 20 days earlier this year.”

“Their findings are likely to have an impact both on the level of staffing across the States sector and on how departments work with each other.The 'visioning' exercise comes at a time when the public sector has never been under such close examination before.”

But the vision faded. The Brave New World of Bill Ogley turned into a chimera, which was as frustrating for him as for anyone else. As he explained later:

“Each States’ Department Chief Officer’s reporting line had been described as being direct to me, as one would have expected in a large English local authority or indeed in a civil service department. However, in fact the Chief Officers reported both to their respective Ministers and also to myself. This duplication left a significant lack of clarity in respect of supervision and accountability. This was the result of a States Assembly decision, and certain politicians in particular, to ensure that the politicians remained in control. The result was that neither the Chief Executive nor the respective Minister had the requisite power, as had been anticipated when the revised government structure was originally devised.”

“The main problem, from my perspective, was that I was in a position where I was accountable for the Chief Officers, but without those officers’ reporting lines being to me.”

Having had uprooted his family from the UK to live in Jersey and with his children at secondary schools in Jersey, leaving was not an immediate option, and instead he had to settle for second best: “I considered that had no real choice but to get on with things as best that I could and work within the confines of the structures as they were”

Finally Bill Ogley decided that enough was enough, and invoked a clause allowing him to leave when he wanted to. This itself was a reflection on the inability of the Chief Minister, Terry Le Sueur, to exercise anything remotely like solid political oversight. A degree of slackness from the Chief Minister meant that Bill Ogley’s resignation came as a surprise, and evidently the conflict between Mr Ogley and Senator Ozouf was left alone on the basis that it would go away of its own accord. Instead, Mr Ogley left of his own accord, and with a considerable “golden handshake” – a clause in his contract which had been witnessed by Senator Le Sueur.

After Bill Ogley left, John Richardson took over the top job. Kevin Keen was brought in to try and improve matters and he certainly exposed the dysfunctional nature of government, with the silo mentalities described recently by Charlie Parker. But he had no real power to effect change, and rather than being sucked in and becoming part of the problem, he left to take his troubleshooting skills elsewhere.

Matters stagnated because there was very little drive from the top for change. In a recent comment, John Henwood laid at least a substantial part of the blame on Richardson’s shoulders:

“Mr Parker's predecessor in the role was a career Jersey Civil Servant and when it came to managing change he didn't have any tools in the toolbox other than those he acquired during 35 years working his way up the greasy pole to the top. So, not entirely his fault because the only way he knew was the way that had been perpetuated for so long. It's was a case of "Buggin's turn" when it came to promotion and so poorly qualified people achieved ever more senior roles and when it was discovered they were not up to the task in hand they weren't moved out as they should have been, but left in place and excuses made for failings. And who is to blame? The policy makers, the people we elected to sort things out, but didn't. Now Mr Parker has the unenviable task of sorting out years of mismanagement, poor decision making and passing the parcel when things went wrong.”

One of the reasons Ian Gorst, as Chief Minister, was so keen to put accountability by Chief Officers directly to the Chief Executive was precisely because without it, Charlie Parker would have effectively been neutralised just as Bill Ogley was.

Churchill spoke of the situation before the Second World War as the “years the locusts ate”, years where government “decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all powerful to be impotent.”

And his words could just as easily apply to the dysfunctional public service which Charlie Parker is now trying to reform:

“Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong—these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history.”