Monday, 21 May 2007

Sagan and Boyle: A Lesson in Snap Judgements

The late Carl Sagan, in Pale Blue Dot, wrote:

"How is it that hardly any major religion has looked at science and
concluded, 'This is better than we thought! The Universe is much bigger than
our prophets said, grander, more subtle, more elegant'? Instead they say,
'No, no, no! My god is a little god, and I want him to stay that way.' A
religion, old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the Universe as
revealed by modern science might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence
and awe hardly tapped by the conventional faiths. "

If Sagan had looked a bit further afield, as far back (and probably further)
as Robert Boyle, he would have found this is not the case. For example, I
find this quotation from the 17th century!:

"When with bold telescopes I survey the old and newly discovered stars and
planets, when with excellent microscopes I discern the unimitable subtility
of nature's curious workmanship; and when, in a word, by the help of
anatomical knives, and the light of chymical furnaces, I study the book of
nature, I find myself oftentimes reduced to exclaim with the Psalmist, How
manifold are Thy works, O Lord! in wisdom hast Thou made them all."

Robert Boyle (25 January 1627 - 30 December 1691)

To rephrase Sagan: How is it that people make glib snap judgements without
doing the smallest modicum of research?

Irritation

Glanced at a copy of "Present Time", the Re-evaluation Counseling Journal, article on irritation. (Minor irritation: why can't they spell "counseling" properly as "counselling", or is it one of those "lite" kind of brand names?)

Tim Jackins said a good way to respond to people who irritated you was not to get cross, but instead to beam at them and say:

"What a wonderful mess you've made of your work. I wish I could make mistakes like you can."

or (to get the full American tone)

"Gee! What a wonderful mess you've made of your work. I wish I could make mistakes like you can."


The effect is to "discharge" your irritation. What a wonderful idea (he says in a tone dripping with sarcasm).

However, I think a warning should be given to retreat very hastily before the person you address attempts to discharge their irritation on your face!!!!

My girlfriend (whose copy this was) said she was irritated by my habit of "pouncing on her magazines and commenting on them". She decided not to follow Mr Jackin's advice.


More on Wycliffe Hall

A little more information on the Church Times. I hope it gets resolved. It is a pity that they cannot be more transparent and circumspect like Rowan Williams, for example, who when he was consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury, made it clear that while he had particular (if tentative) opinions on particularly divisive issues (see A Ray of Darkness, for example), he believed that the role of a bishop is to be a focus of unity, not to push his own personal agenda, a position welcomed by Alistair McGraph (Church of England Newspaper (no. 5627).

So it would be nice if, for example, Simon Vibert, would say that while he held particular views about women priests, bishops etc, that he would not push that agenda in an unbalanced way as vice-Principle of Wycliffe Hall, but take into account the diversity of the Church of England, and note also that his views, while held honestly, were in a minority amongst those who - equally honestly - disagreed on the subject of women bishops (as evidenced by Synod resolutions); moreoever, it can be seen from Tom Wright's contribution that it is not just a matter of saying - if you look at the texts, scripture supports the Vibert position - as other equally scriptural arguments can be made to the contrary.

A case in point from the atheists. I've just been reading Michael Ruse on Christianity and Darwinism, and he gives a vey balanced and fair assessment, and engages with the history and variety in Christianity. That contrasts with Richard Dawkins, who is simply full of hot rhetorical air, and has about as much idea of what Christianity is about as thinking Easter is about the Easter Bunny and Easter Eggs. One is balanced, one is not. A lesson for Wycliffe Hall, perhaps?







From the Church Times (UK) --

WYCLIFFE HALL, Oxford, is the focus of a dispute involving allegations of a culture of bullying and intimidation, and of an ultra-conservative attitude to women. The governing Council of the theological college, a permanent private hall of the University, is chaired by the Bishop of Liverpool, the Rt Revd James Jones. This week it said that it had embarked on a review of the college's governance. The complaints centre on the management style of the Principal, the Revd Dr Richard Turnbull, and his appointment of the Revd Simon Vibert as Vice-Principal. Mr Vibert had made public his belief that women should not teach men. He co-wrote, with the Revd Dr Mark Burkill and the Revd Dr David Peterson, a Latimer Trust paper that argued that a woman on her own should not teach men about faith or lead a congregation (Ministry Work Group Statement concerning the ministry of women in the Church today). Since Dr Turnbull was appointed in 2005, six full-time or part-time academic staff have resigned posts. In a letter of resignation to Dr Turnbull in March, the former director of studies, Dr Philip Johnston, accused him of leadership "without significant regard for your staff colleagues". Dr Johnston wrote that the new Vice-Principal had been appointed despite a "very strong consensus" of staff and students in favour of a different candidate. Copies of emails suggest that staff and students were then ordered not to speak to the press. The former Principal, the Revd Professor Alister McGrath, said that it would be "quite inappropriate" for him to comment. But he now had no connection with the college. When the former Vice-Principal, the Revd Dr David Wenham, resigned last October, Dr Elaine Storkey, a broadcaster teaching at the college, is understood to have objected when she was told "under no circumstances" to speak to the media; and to have told Dr Turnbull that she reserved the right to speak on any matter not directly related to the college's "inner workings". Dr Storkey said on Tuesday: "A lot has happened since then." But she confirmed that she would not speak to the press. Dr Turnbull, it is understood, told staff that Dr Wenham resigned because of "disagreement with myself as Principal over matters of leadership and management". A further complaint is that the new leadership had signed Anglican Mainstream's "Covenant for the Church of England", which warns bishops to be "biblically orthodox" if they are to retain the convenanters' loyalty. The Revd Rob Merchant, an ex-president of the common room, now a lecturer at Staffordshire University, said on Wednesday that he was watching "the demise of a beloved theological college". "Under the guidance of people like Professor Alister McGrath, Wycliffe Hall was a place of generous orthodoxy able to encompass a spectrum of views and offer support and respect to students and staff alike," he said. He had watched, "bewildered", as excellent staff had left, one after another, with little or no communication from the current management. In one of the documents sent to the Church Times, two members of the governing Council are said to have visited the college and to have been "shocked by the hostility they found at every level of the community to Dr Turnbull". They also found many were dismayed by the Council's "laissez-faire attitude" to the issues, it says. Dr Turnbull said on Wednesday that women were welcome to train as priests at Wycliffe Hall, and that their numbers had increased "significantly". He said that, balancing Mr Vibert's appointment, he also appointed the Revd Will Donaldson, a Charismatic, who was in favour of women's ministry "at every level". Mr Donaldson, from the Willesden area in London diocese, has been appointed as director of Christian leadership. Both men start work on 1 August. Dr Turnbull said that the Council had reaffirmed his leadership of the college on Tuesday. He would not comment further, as disciplinary proceedings were under way. A Council statement on Tuesday said: "The Council has embarked on a major review of its governance and a new development strategy for the future of the Hall in the light of changing patterns of ministerial formation. This inevitably involves changes that are unsettling. "Wycliffe is committed to maintaining its Evangelical ethos and its international reputation for excellence in theological education, ministerial formation, and training for Christian leadership in the Church and the world. "At a meeting of the Council to consider the report of a specially commissioned 'listening process', the Council unanimously reiterated its support for the Principal and committed itself to facilitate the necessary changes."

The Great Dance

"In the plan of the Great Dance, plans without number interlock, and each movement becomes in its season the breaking into flower of the whole design to which all else has been directed. Thus each is equally at the center and none are there by being equals, but some by giving place and some by receiving it, the small things by their smallness and the great by their greatness, and all the patterns linked and looped together by the unions of a kneeling with a sceptred love. "

–The Eldila, C.S. Lewis, Perelandra

I love this quote!

Can a Darwinian be a Christian? the relationship between science and religion

Just reading "Can a Darwinian be a Christian? the relationship between
science and religion" by Michael Ruse.

Ruse lays out the ground by exploring the Darwining paradigm, with all its
variation (from Dawkins to Gould), and Christianity, with all its variation,
noting that Creationist fundamentalism actually only forms a small and very
late distinctive variant (even if a vocal American one) to Christianity. He
notes that from at least the time of Augustine that the Genesis stories were
taken as mythical rather than literal (he missed Jerome on that one), and
that was the position long before Darwin. Exploring in particular the ideas
of Augustine and Aquinas (although he is also up to date with later thinkers
such as Karl Barth, Rowan Williams, Keith Ward, John Polkinhorne), he shows
how well these dovetail in with evolution; there are really not that many
contradictions, some theological ideas mesh better than others, some
patently have problems: "Some areas require still a great deal of thoughtful
work and discussion. The notion of original sin, and its origin in the light
of Darwinian evolutionary theory, is an issue on which no final word has yet
been spoken."; however, the problem areas he considers not fatal, but as an
area for exploration.

Ruse states his position clearly: he is an atheist. Yet he does not see that
there is any inherent contradiction between Christianity and the theology of
evolution, unless you are a Creation Scientist / fundamentalist, but he
knows from his reading of history that is a late development, and not
representantive of Christianity as a whole. It is a balanced and fair
appraisal by a thinker who presents arguments (rather than Richard Dawkin's
brand of rhetoric), and it is a shame that this book, rather than "The God
Delusion", is not in the best-seller lists. It engages with real issues, and
not "straw men", and Ruse is equally aware that, like Christianity,
Darwinism covers a spectrum of different positions, all of which have
arguments to comment them.

John Habgood, writing in the Sunday Times, noted that "By concentrated
argument around a number of themes -- the origin of life, the soul, design,
miracles, pain, ethics, social Darwinism etc -- he manages to throw real
light on the complexity of the issues, while suggesting how different
standpoints might be re- conciled. Ruse's grasp of the subject, clarity of
exposition, fair-mindedness and light touch make it a thoroughly stimulating
exercise"

Friday, 18 May 2007

Wycliff Hall - behind the scenes

Some news on Thinking Anglicans about the Wycliffe Hall row. I wondered if the Simon Vibert was the same one who was at Victoria College with me, I think, and who went into the C of E? He was very conservative evangelical, I seem to remember.

I've looked at his paper (http://www.latimertrust.org/download/66comment.pdf) on women and the church, and it is very much the old style "this is what the bible says and these texts prove it" approach.

"For the same scriptural reasons outlined above, if episcopacy is the exercise of authority through teaching and discipline, it is not a defensible form of ministry for women. The issue is not simply that of oversight in the diocese but of modelling biblical patterns of relationship and responsibility."

That is a quite appalling thing for a minister in a church which already accepts women priests has to say! Most of his arguments almost seem like "roll the clock back" moves, to do away with women priests. He leans over heavily on a few key texts. Maybe he should join the Plymouth Brethren; the last time I heard that kind of argument was an Exeter University from them.

I compared it with N.T. Wright's much better http://www.ntwrightpage.com/Wright_Women_Service_Church.htm.

At the moment NTW also seems to have caused a certain amount of annoyance to the Anglican fundamentalists by presenting a different perspective on atonement theories, and critiquing theirs!

I don;t know if this Simon Vibert is the same one who is based in Wimbledon, or if there are several! (http://www.wimbledonchurch.co.uk/people/simon_vibert.htm); he also has an aggressively anti-Catholic sermon (or diatribe) on the Eucharist (http://www.wimbledonchurch.co.uk/articles/communion.htm), in which he says "Jesus was not talking about some future perpetual act of sacrifice going on down the history of the church. He was talking about one sacrifice, the sacrifice he is about to make on the cross....".

Other notable comments: "One practical consequence of this is that it is important that we use appropriate church language when we gather to break bread and drink wine. First, I don't think we should use the word 'Priest' for that is an inappropriate word for my job...Secondly I don't think that we should use the word 'Altar', because the table at the top is not a place where a sacrifice is being made, rather it is a place where a meal is being prepared. ...There is no change in the substance of the bread or the wine. The bread remains bread; the wine remains wine.". I doubt if he understands what Aquinas meant "substance" in Aristotelian categories! It would be interesting to know how he deals with left over bread. John Macquarrie in his book 'A Guide to the Sacraments" (which is one of the few to appreciate the subtelty in Aquinas idea of transubstantiation), mentions that how the bread is disposed of is an interesting pragmatic test of how it is perceived (i.e reserved, eaten, or just thrown away).

 


 

WYCLIFFE HALL, Oxford, is the focus of a dispute involving allegations of a culture of bullying and intimidation, and of an ultra-conservative attitude to women.

The governing Council of the theological college, a permanent private hall of the University, is chaired by the Bishop of Liverpool, the Rt Revd James Jones. This week it said that it had embarked on a review of the college's governance.

The complaints centre on the management style of the Principal, the Revd Dr Richard Turnbull, and his appointment of the Revd Simon Vibert as Vice-Principal. Mr Vibert had made public his belief that women should not teach men.

He co-wrote, with the Revd Dr Mark Burkill and the Revd Dr David Peterson, a Latimer Trust paper that argued that a woman on her own should not teach men about faith or lead a congregation (Ministry Work Group Statement concerning the ministry of women in the Church today.

Since Dr Turnbull was appointed in 2005, six full-time or part-time academic staff have resigned posts. In a letter of resignation to Dr Turnbull in March, the former director of studies, Dr Philip Johnston, accused him of leadership "without significant regard for your staff colleagues". Dr Johnston wrote that the new Vice-Principal had been appointed despite a "very strong consensus" of staff and students in favour of a different candidate…

 

 

What is central?

"The meeting took place in the S.C.M. Secretary's room in Trinity, the C.I.C.C.U's representatives being the President, D.T. Dick and myself. After an hour's conversation which got us nowhere, one direct and vital question was put: 'Does the S.C.M. consider the atoning blood of Jesus Christ as the central point of their message?' And the answer given was, 'No, not as central, although it is given a place in our teaching.' That answer settled the matter, for we explained to them at once that the atoning blood was so much the heart of our message that we could never join with a movement which gave it any lesser place." (Norman Grubb)

I find it amazing that "the atoning blood" terminology is given such a central place in their message! It is a kind of Marcionite bias. From my point of view, the gospels are central, and the simple credal statement of the letters of the New Testament - "Jesus is Lord".

John's Gospel says: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life". It seems to me that belief in Jesus is important here, and John does not seem to mention "atoning blood". What is going in with a message that uses a language which one doesn't find anywhere in the ecumenical creeds, and which is being made a standard for defining "true" Christianity - "I believe in the atoning blood"? Well, that is not in my creed, or the Nicene creed.

 

 

On Interpretation

On Interpretation

Dick Tahta

Plato's dialogue, the Theatetus, contains a nested sequence of accounts-interpretations of interpretations-that lead back to a purported discussion on the nature of knowledge between Socrates and two mathematicians, Theodorus and his young student Theatetus. This discussion is of interest to historians of mathematics because, in passing, it describes Theodorus as having established the irrationality of square roots of non-square numbers up to 17-'where for some reason he got stuck'-and it indicates that Theatetus may have generalized the result. It is not clear why Theodorus stopped at 17 and many plausible and implausible interpretations have been proposed. But what is more important in the context of the Platonic dialogue is that Theatetus invokes the binary classification of numbers in terms of rationality as a possible metaphor for what he imagines are two sorts of knowledge, namely the sciences on the one hand as opposed to something else on the other, that he does not yet quite understand, but which is implicit in Socrates' method of inquiry.

Further issues about the nature of knowledge may be found in the multiple resonances that Plato establishes in his writing. Plato starts by presenting a conversation between two philosophers, Euclid of Megara (i.e., not the mathematician) and Terpsion. This is said to take place on the day in 369BC that Theatetus is dying from dysentery and wounds incurred in the defence of Corinth. Euclid recalls that many years previously Socrates had described a discussion that he had had with the then young Theatetus and his teacher, Theodorus, Euclid recounts that he himself had taken notes during Socrates' spoken account and had then written up a version in direct speech, which he claims he had afterwards carefully checked over with Socrates. Terpsion suggests this might be a good time to go through the written version. The two philosophers then settle down to hear a reading of the piece by a boy servant, and Plato provides the script for us. It is not until the very end that Terpsion-and the reader of Plato's book-realizes that the discussion about knowledge must be supposed to have taken place in 399BC on the same day that Socrates was charged with corrupting Athenian youth. Thirty years later, the philosophers are reminded of the death of Socrates at the very time that they are aware of the dying Theatetus.

Plato presents some arguments about the nature of knowledge in the form of an account (his) of an account (Euclid's) of an account (Socrates') of a conversation between three people. And the present reader is now reminded that what is being read is my account of someone's translation of this sequence of accounts. Which

of these most truly reflects what is supposed to have happened? Can there be knowledge without some sort of representation, without some sort of account?

Or, to put the problem in another context, suppose someone gives you an account of a transcript of a film of some classroom dialogue: how confident are you in your understanding of the original event? Consider, for example, the account given by David Pimm (see Chapter 9 of this book) of a transcript of a sequence from an edited videotape of a classroom episode: what do you feel you know about the original event? Would you have felt more confident if you had been there yourself when the episode was being filmed? Some knowledge may be immediate; but much of what we know comes to us mediated through representation, through preconception, through theory. Socratic ignorance may be preferable where the only other choice seems to lie-in the words of Seth Bernadete, a recent translator of the Theatetus-'between an immediacy that is not available and a mediacy that is uneliminable.' (Bernadete, 1986a, p. 88).

But another alternative might be to embrace mediacy and make it serve one's ends. Socrates seeks to persuade Theatetus to discard an understanding of knowledge as 'true opinion'. He is critical of the view-ascribed to the philosopher Protagoras and advanced here by the two mathematicians-that knowledge is based on perception and that man is the measure of all things. For then knowledge becomes relative, and this was unacceptable, at any rate for Plato. But it is more commonly accepted nowadays that truth is a problematic notion and that what we can demand of opinion is that it be fruitful. And according to Goethe, was fruchtbar ist, allein ist wahr (only that which is fruitful is true). This is certainly the approach taken by psychoanalysts, who are of course very centrally concerned with interpretation in their work. Analysts invoke a distinction between narrative truth and historical truth: interpretation is understood to be a creative construction rather than a supposedly accurate historical re-construction.

Interpretations are persuasive…not because of their evidential value but because of their rhetorical appeal; conviction emerges because the fit is good, not because we have necessarily made contact with the past. (Spence, 1982, p. 32)

So, in considering classroom accounts, it may be helpful to consider various interpretations, judging them not for some supposed veracity but in terms of their fruitfulness for the matter in hand, which may be supposed ultimately to be the improvement of our understanding and practice of the teaching and learning of mathematics. It may also be helpful to borrow some of the notions invoked by psychoanalysts when considering our own interpretations of classroom events, whether mediated or not. Thus, I hope to show that it could be fruitful to invoke the unconscious processes of displacement and condensation. These have also been characterized by linguists as associated respectively with the grammatical notions of metonymy and metaphor, and I have described elsewhere how interpretations of classroom practice, and of mathematical history, might be made in these terms (see Tahta, 1991, p. 229). Here, I want to try to illustrate the working of displacement and condensation in our understanding, or interpretation, of a mathematical theorem, and then in some further comments on Pimm's account of a classroom episode.

A Classical Theorem

It seems appropriate to take as an example the irrationality of the square root of 2, the classical result which Plato describes Theodorus and Theatetus as having generalized. It is not known for certain how it might originally have been proved that the diagonal of a square was not commensurable with its side: there are some plausible, geometric reconstructions. The well-known, dramatically elegant, arithmetic proof-ascribed by later Greek writers to Pythagoras-is a typical (and often claimed to be the first) mathematical example of proof by so-called reductio ad absurdum, a logical argument used over and over again by Socrates in Plato's dialogues. The proof is by analysis (as opposed to synthesis) in the sense that it starts with what is required, only in this case with its negative: you pretend (liar!) that you know the square root of 2 to be rational. In modern algebraic terms, the pretence is that √2 is a fraction a/b where a and b may be supposed to have no common factor. A sequence of transformations yields in the first place the result that a must be even-in which case b, having no common factor with a, much be odd; but further transformation then yields that b must be even. It seems that b must be both odd and even. Not accepting this, you backtrack to find the mistake in your argument, to find (surprise, surprise!) that it can only have been with your initial pretence.

The sequence of steps from one algebraic equation to the next can be associated with the psychoanalytic notion of displacement, a process in which links are established through a chain of connections some of which may not always be conscious. A typical example would be the slip of the tongue, in which a word gets substituted by another word. An example-from The Merchant of Venice-is Portia's hint to Bassanio that she is wholly his: 'One half of me is yours, the other half is yours-mine own, I would say.' A sequence of such shifts often occurs in dreams or in the activity of free association of words. Algebraic transformation of the equation √2 = a/b also involves a chain of substitutions. Seymour Papert has suggested that many students faced with equations of this sort engage-'almost as if they have read Freud'-in a process of mathematical free association (Papert, 1980, p. 198). And just as the psychoanalyst occasionally interrupts the flow of associations, the algebraic transformations are punctuated by an occasional conscious interpretation-for instance, when d = 2b2 is understood to mean that a², and so also a, mustbe even.

In the course of the proof, the square root sign is got rid of, but the 2 reappears, not in its original form but as a sign of evenness. Papert describes this feature as a sort of mathematical pun and associates this with the psychoanalytic notion of condensation, a process in which a single idea or symbol is at an intersection of several associative chains and coagulates a cluster of meanings. Dreams, for example, are shorter and more compressed than their verbal descriptions and eventual interpretations; a play on words-a pun-operates in the same way. Mathematics is itself a powerful condensation of experience; its 'abstractions' are derived from a number of different 'concrete' examples.

Moreover, as mathematical theorems are transmitted across generations, they condense the accumulated experience of past interpretations. This yields another sequence of accounts of accounts; but, as in the game of 'Chinese whispers', the final account may be quite unlike the initial one. Irrationality is not quite the same notion as incommensurability: in my end is not my beginning. John Mason has

suggested that many named theorems would not now be recognized by their originators:

Cayley's theorem, a fundamental theorem in group theory, doesn't exist in his writings. Unless you dig and dig and dig and recognise-because of your current awareness of what is a significant result-a sort of little kernel, a little something or other which you want to hold on to and say, 'that is a theorem'. It seems to me that in mathematics we transform everytime we present a theorem. (Mason, 1991, p. 16)

There is a further sense in which the proof of irrationality condenses a number of very dramatic, external associations that do not illuminate the mathematics as such, but have an expressive, mythical quality of their own. Such are the stories-and they may well be fictions-about the supposed consternation of the Pythagoreans at the discovery of irrationality. Some historians of mathematics would now deny that these are historical truths, and they would not wish to multiply narrative truths. Others-and I declare my own sympathy with these-are prepared to weave as rich a tapestry of associations as possible. For example, Michel Serres reads the supposed crisis at the dawn of Greek mathematics in terms of three deaths: not only the legendary death of the shipwrecked Hippasus who was held to have divulged the discovery of irrationality, and the historical death of Theatetus who developed a classification of irrational numbers, but also the turning away from some of the teachings of the revered Parmenides, which Plato somewhat startlingly called a form of parricide (Serres, 1982, p. 130).

The third death-the parricide-arises in the following way. Parmenides had formulated the law of contradiction invoked in proofs by reductio ad absurdum. But he was emphatic that Being (that which is) is One; its opposite, non-Being (that which is not) cannot be. Whatever exists can be thought of, and conversely, everything that can be thought of exists. But, he claimed, you cannot think of what is not, you could not know it, you could not even say it. However, in another Platonic dialogue, the Sophist, Theodorus brings along a philosopher, referred to as a Stranger, who tells Theatetus,

Don't take me to be, as it were, a kind of parricide…It will be necessary…to put the speech of our father Parmenides to the torture and force it to say that 'that which is not' is in some respects, and again, in turn, 'that which is' is not. (Bernadete, 1986b, p. 33)

The Stranger is prepared-despite Parmenides-to take opposites into account; the supposed parricide may be seen as a return to the dualism of the early Pythagoreans. (Theatetus, the mathematician for whom everything is countable, is certainly already prepared to take opposites into a count!) 'That which is not' can be conceived: for 'thinking makes it so', as Hamlet claimed, illustrating this with a pair of opposites, namely good and bad. How would the early Pythagoreans have conceived of that which is not commensurable? John Fauvel has pointed out that incommensurability is not in itself plausible without some sort of proof: its first proof must have constituted its discovery (Fauvel, 1987, p. 18). Proving irrationality made it so!

The proof establishes the contradiction that a number can be both even and

odd. By a series of intriguing displacements, Serres suggests that because 'even means equal, united, flat, same while odd means bizarre, unmatched, extra, left over, unequal, in short, other, the contradictory result may be described as asserting that 'Same is Other'. This cannot be so; but because that which is not rational has been proved to exist as well as what is rational, then numbers may just as well be irrational as rational. This dualism-masterfully explored by Theatetus-means that irrationality, or what Parmenides would have called non-Being, is in a sense on the same footing as rationality, or Being. So, according to Serres, Same is indeed Other 'after a fashion'; and this is the parricide of Parmenides.

'Legend, myth, history, philosophy, and pure science have common borders over which a unitary schema builds bridges', writes Serres, stretching the condensations even further to include a play on the name, Metapontum, of the birthplace of he who was shipwrecked. The 'unitary schema' reasserts the oneness of Being with a vengeance; but the crossing of boundaries brings disparate and sometimes contradictory things together. Following Parmenides, we usually assume that contradictions cannot-must not-be simultaneously entertained: either something is or it is not. But condensations demand otherwise. David Pimm has suggested that this is why metaphor can be so disquieting in mathematics:

for the very essence of metaphor…is to be able to claim at one and the same time that 'it is and it is not'! I assert 'a function is a machine' (and yet I also know it is not one)-the strength of the metaphoric assertion comes through the use of the verb to be-yet it carries with it implicitly its own negation. (Pimm, 1995, Chapter 10)

Narrative Truths

The ambivalence of simultaneous assertion and negation is familiar in psychoanalysis. It is perhaps this accommodation of the contradiction inherent in metaphor that makes some psychoanalytic narratives seem, at first sight, implausible. David Pimm quotes some startling examples from the work of Melanie Klein, including that of a 17-year-old patient, known as Lisa, who had understood addition when the things being added were the same, but not when they were different. Klein suggests, in effect, that addition was a metaphor that condensed various meanings for Lisa, including her difficulty in entertaining the idea of parental coitus, where different genitals are brought together. These remarks occur in a very comprehensive survey-based on some of her cases-of the role of the school in the libidinal development of children. Lisa is mentioned quite often in this survey; for example, it is reported that she recalled always finding it difficult to divide a large number by a smaller one. She associated this difficulty with a dream involving mutilation of a horse, and her going shopping for an orange and a candle. This-and its inevitable (Kleinian) interpretation in terms of castration-may seem far-fetched to some people, but it is precisely the way of the unconscious to be far-fetched. Another analyst might have made a less severe interpretation, but the issue must always be how fruitful this particular interpretation had been in the course of Lisa's analysis, and this, of course, we do not know.

For Klein, 'the tendency to overcome [the fear of castration] seems in general to form one of the roots from which counting and arithmetic have evolved' (Klein, 1950, p. 80). That arithmetical operations might symbolize such matters is supported by evidence from many other analysts. Klein assembles a lot of further detail about Lisa's-and other children's-unconscious thinking in her account. For instance, Lisa disliked the number 3 'because a third person is of course always superfluous'. Similar oedipal conflicts have been reported recently by Lusiane Weyl-Keiley, a therapist and teacher, who has shown how some typical problems encountered in remedial work in mathematics may be interpreted psychoanalytically. For example, 3 may be associated with the family triple-mother, father, child-and Weyl-Keiley describes a depressed adolescent for whom 5-2 was always 2. Asked to display this by folding fingers of one hand, he was unable to sustain the display of three fingers and had to fold down another. 'You see it makes two', he announced, keeping himself, it is suggested, out of the family conflict (Weyl-Keiley, 1985, p. 38).

Another example of the possible psychic significance-for some individuals-of a mathematical topic may be found in Klein's report that Lisa recalled never understanding an equation with more than one unknown. The exercise of interpreting that in psychoanalytic terms is, as they say, left to the reader. But another sort of condensed meaning may be found in the reminder that in the early development of algebra there must also have been something particularly difftcult about the notion of two unknowns. For Diophantos, who tackled various problems with apparently two or more unknowns, seemed unable-or unwilling-to symbolize more than one. A second unknown was always arbitrarily given a particular numerical value, the problem then being expressed in terms of one variable. When this caused some inconsistency or infelicity, the value of the second unknown was modified in order to satisfy all the conditions of the problem.

For example, Diophantos sought a Pythagorean triple such that the hypot-enuse less each side is a cube (see van der Waerden, 1988, p. 288). His method is here more conveniently described in modern notation. Pythagorean triples can be expressed in terms of two parameters; calling one of the associated parameters 5, Diophantos arbitrarily took the other to be 3. The base, height and hypoteneuse are then s² - 9, 6s and s² + 9, respectively. Hypotenuse less base is 18, which is not a cube. To make it one, you need to have assigned the second parameter a number whose square, doubled, is a cube. So try 2! The sides are then s²-4, 4s, s²+4. Hypotenuse less height is now the square of s - 2, which has to be a cube. So set 5 = 10! The sides are now as required. This was also the approach to such problems taken later-and independently-by the Arab mathematician, Al-Khwarizmi; it re-appears once again in the mediaeval 'rule of false position'.

We admire the crucial step that Diophantos made-the awareness that he could name the as-yet-unknown by a special symbol (it looked like an s and may have been an abbreviation of the Greek word for number, arithmos). We have no idea why he was unable, or unwilling, to invoke a second symbol at the same time. But it was clearly a difficult issue. The point here is, of course, not to interpret Diophantos as having some kind of unconscious block, but to establish that entertaining two unknowns may be problematic in itself, and to suggest that in Lisa's case, where other relevant evidence is also available, this might be seen as having come also to symbolize unresolved issues about her oedipal conflicts. It is not, of course, that two unknowns will always represent two parents for everyone, but rather that they may attract such unconscious condensations for some individuals at some time of their lives.

Listening to, and trying to make sense of, other people's accounts of their experience can be difficult. Interpretation is a fragile instrument which is often made to bear too much ontological weight. Socrates explains to Theodorus that he is afraid that they will never be able to understand the thought of Parmenides, and that in their discussion of the nature of knowledge they can only multiply interpretations which will never allow them to reach a satisfactory conclusion. All that Socrates, whose mother was a midwife, can do is to use his 'maieutic art'-or intellectual obstetrics-to help Theatetus deliver his own understanding.

So I'm afraid that we'll fail as much to understand what he [Parmenides] was saying as we'll fall far short of what he thought when he spoke, and-this is the greatest thing-that for whose sake the speech has started out, about knowledge, whatever it is, that that will prove to be unexamined under the press of the speeches that are bursting in like revellers, if anyone will obey them. And this is all the more the case now, since the speech we now awaken makes it impossible to handle by its immensity, regardless of what one will do. For if one will examine it incidentally, it would undergo what it does not deserve, and if one will do it adequately, it will by its lengthening wipe out the issue of knowledge. We must do neither, but we must try by means of the maieutic art to deliver Theaetetus from whatever he's pregnant with in regard to knowledge. (Bernadete, 1986a, p. 51)

Finding the Truth in the Mistake

Introducing his own discussion of a transcript of a videotape of a classroom dialogue, Pimm emphasizes how difficult it is to present convincing descriptions of supposed unconscious processes. His interpretations of the quoted extract in terms of the linguistic dimensions of metonymy and metaphor seem to be both apt and convincing. His account could also be seen-more or less equivalently-in terms of the associated psychoanalytical processes of displacement and condensation. In the first place, when the teacher asks Lorna to recall the word 'infinity', her answer 'fidelity' may be interpreted in terms of displacement: the associated, but possibly disturbing, word 'infidelity' is swiftly disavowed and replaced by 'fidelity'. On the other hand, taking infinity to be a powerful condensation of meanings, her answer may be interpreted as directly relating to an associated meaning, that of 'lasting for ever'; unable to recall the actual word required she responds with the word 'fidelity' that has a similar, and for adolescents a particularly potent, meaning. Both interpretations can be taken into account at the same time, for the unconscious accommodates contradictions and converses.

The example underlines how irrelevant the quest for historical truth may be in such cases. But why, someone may ask, would anyone be interested in some narrative truth, let alone a proliferation of such truths? One possible answer is clear from a further reading of the transcript, which like so many classroom reports, is a record of someone's public success (here, significantly, that of the two boys, David and Gary) at the expense of someone's humiliating public failure.

The teacher is described as repeating Lorna's word 'fidelity' with 'rising tones of surprise and disbelief'. The rest of the class can be left in no doubt that Lorna has got it wrng. This is common enough in the contemporary classroom. But, to paraphrase an oft-quoted sentence of Jules Henry's, To a Zuni, Hopi or Dakota Indian, David and Gary's performance would seem cruel beyond belief, for competition, the wringing of success from somebody's failure, is a form of torture foreign to these non-competitive cultures.'

The point about the possible interpretations of Lorna's mistake is that they suggest ways in which she may, in fact, have got it right. They support a classroom attitude which encourages everyone-teacher and fellow students-to find the truth in the mistake. Whatever our view of what psychoanalysts say, we know, at least, that they listen, and this is something that we should all do more of in our classrooms. We can also strive to contain our premature interpretations and let our students deliver their own.

Andrew, aged 5, is enormously energetic and egocentric. The world revolves round him. He has an exuberant preoccupation with words-talks incessantly, rhyming when he can and following up word-associa-tions with unconcealed glee and self-delight. He pushes people and things, jumps up and down, shouts, tears and throws paper, stamps his feet. His aggressive masculinity is at once charming and intolerable. Andrew and friends are measuring. lan solemnly records that he is '3 recorders and 1 pen tall'. Andrew has been measuring the length of the table using a block of wood. He asks me to write out an appropriate sentence for him. The table is…pieces of wood long.' Gripping the pencil like a dagger, he inserts a 7. He then stabs the paper a few times and produces what looks like a row of 7's under the sentence. I say nothing, but I feel puzzled. Is Andrew being exuberant and generous with his numerals in the way he is with spoken words? After a brief, shared silence, Andrew explains to me: 'you write it seven times because there were seven of them.' (Tahta, 1975, p. 10)

In a moving postscript to his chapter, David Pimm relates what he heard when he listened to 3-year-old Katie. She counts, pointing a finger in turn at him, her mother and herself: 'One, two, two'. She says she knows it should be one, two, three, but adds, 'I am pretending'. The previous evening she had told him, 'I thought you were daddy' and earlier that morning she had announced, 'daddy dead'. He offers some sensitive possible interpretations of her apparent avoidance of' three'. It seems overwhelmingly obvious that feelings about the missing father are being processed in all this. This confirms the authenticity of Klein's account of Lisa's version of the (not always homely!) maxim, 'two's company, three's a crowd', and of the other examples of number avoidance mentioned by Lusiane Weyl-Keiley among others. I cannot resist adding a further possible interpretation that links with Andrew's explanation of his seven sevens: in counting the two two times because there were two of them in her family, perhaps Katie was also unobtrusively telling David that she knew that he was not her father and that was all right. The unconscious can be a creative as well as a destructive force, and young children often tell it like it is. Moreover, alternative interpretations can be

simultaneously entertained, even where they may seem to be contradictory. For that is the way of the unconscious: same is other, after a fashion.

Note

1. I am particularly grateful to John Mason, David Pimm and David Wheeler for their perceptive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

References

BERNADETE, S. (1986a) Plato's Theatetus, University of Chicago Press.
BERNADETE, S. (1986b) Plato's Sophist, University of Chicago Press.
FAUVEL, J. (1987) Mathematics in the Greek world, MA290-unit 2, Milton Keynes, Open University.
KLEIN, M. (1950) Contributions to Psychoanalysis, Hogarth Press.
MASON, J. (1991) in TAHTA, D. (Ed) The history of mathematics in terms of awareness, transcript of a seminar with Caleb Gattegno, Reading, Educational Solutions.
PAPERT, S. (1980) Mindstorms, Basic Books.
PIMM, D. (1995) Symbols and Meanings in School Mathematics, London, Routledge.
SERRES, M. (1982) Hermes, John Hopkins University Press.
SPENCE, D. (1982) Narrative Truth and Historical Truth, Norton.
TAHTA, D. (1975) 'Seven times', Recognitions, I, Derby, Association of Teachers of Mathematics.
TAHTA, D. (1991) 'Understanding and desire', in PIMM, D. and LOVE, E. (Eds) Teaching and Learning School Mathematics, Hodder and Stoughton.
VAN DER WAERDEN, B. (1988) Science Awakening, Amsterdam, Kluwer.
WEYL-KEILEY, L. (1985) Victoires sur les maths, Paris, Robert Laffont.

idoneity

The OED is the only dictionary I've found with it in. Apart from Dick Tahta, using it to descibe mathematics, it only seems to crop up in the 1600s and 1822!


idoneity

Fitness, suitableness or aptitude.

1617 COLLINS Def. Bp. Ely II. x. 488 We are not to meane it of morall idoneity, or morall sufficiencie, but of Ecclesiasticall. 1668 HOWE Bless. Righteous (1825) 139 They want the..meetness, the aptitude or idoneity for the inheritance of the Saints in light. 1822 C. BUTLER Remin. (1823) I. 32 To inquire and report upon the learning..and general idoneity of the purchaser.

[ad. late L. idoneits, -ttem, f. idoneus (see next). Cf. F. idonéité, It. idoneità.]

Bad Writing

I was interested to come across an evern earlier essay by Chesterton on the subject ("The Angry Author"), in which he makes a number of interesting points about bad arguments. My bete noire is "progress" or "awareness"!






(1) Don't use a noun and then an adjective that crosses out the noun. An adjective qualifies, it cannot contradict. Don't say, "Give me a patriotism that is free from all boundaries." It is like saying, "Give me a pork pie with no pork in it." Don't say, "I look forward to that larger religion that shall have no special dogmas." It is like saying, "I look forward to that larger quadruped who shall have no feet." A quadruped means something with four feet; and a religion means something that commits a man to some doctrine about the universe. Don't let the meek substantive be absolutely murdered by the joyful, exuberant adjective.

(2) Don't say you are not going to say a thing, and then say it. This practice is very flourishing and successful with public speakers. The trick consists of first repudiating a certain view in unfavourable terms, and then repeating the same view in favourable terms. Perhaps the simplest form of it may be found in a landlord of my neighbourhood, who said to his tenants in an election speech, "Of course I'm not going to threaten you, but if this Budget passes the rents will go up." The thing can be done in many forms besides this. "I am the last man to mention party politics; but when I see the Empire rent in pieces by irresponsible Radicals," etc. "In this hall we welcome all creeds. We have no hostility against any honest belief; but only against that black priestcraft and superstition which can accept such a doctrine as," etc. "I would not say one word that could ruffle our relations with Germany. But this I will
say; that when I see ceaseless and unscrupulous armament," etc. "Please don't do it. Decide to make a remark or not to make a remark. But don't fancy that you have somehow softened the saying of a thing by having just promised not to say it.


(3) Don't use secondary words as primary words. "Happiness" (let us say) is a primary word. You know when you have the thing, and you jolly well know when you haven't. "Progress" is a secondary word; it means the degree of one's approach to happiness, or to some such solid ideal. But modern controversies constantly turn on asking, "Does Happiness help Progress?" Thus, I see in the New Age this week a letter from Mr. Egerton Swann, in which he warns the world against me and my friend Mr. Belloc, on the ground that our democracy is "spasmodic" (whatever that means); while our "reactionism is settled and permanent." It never strikes Mr. Swann that democracy means something in itself; while "reactionism" means nothing--except in connection with democracy. You cannot react except from something. If Mr. Swann thinks I have ever reacted from the doctrine that the people should rule, I wish he would give me the reference.


(4) Don't say, "There is no true creed; for each creed believes itself right and the others wrong." Probably one of the creeds is right and the others are wrong. Diversity does show that most of the views must be wrong. It does not by the faintest logic show that they all must be wrong. I suppose there is no subject on which opinions differ with more desperate sincerity than about which horse will win the Derby. These are certainly solemn convictions; men risk ruin for them. The man who puts his shirt on Potosi must believe in that animal, and each of the other men putting their last garments upon other quadrupeds must believe in them quite as sincerely. They are all serious, and most of them are wrong. But one of them is right. One of the faiths is justified; one of the
horses does win; not always even the dark horse which might stand for Agnosticism, but often the obvious and popular horse of Orthodoxy. Democracy has its occasional victories; and even the Favourite has been known to come in first. But the point here is that something comes in first. That there were many beliefs does not destroy the fact that there was one well-founded belief. I believe (merely upon authority) that the world is round. That there may be tribes who believe it to be triangular or oblong does not alter the fact that it is certainly some shape, and therefore not any other shape. Therefore I repeat, with the wail of imprecation, don't say that the variety of creeds prevents you from accepting any creed. It is an unintelligent remark.


(5) Don't (if any one calls your doctrine mad, which is likely enough), don't answer that madmen are only the minority and the sane only the majority. The sane are sane because they are the corporate substance of mankind; the insane are not a minority because they are not a mob. The man who thinks himself a man thinks the next man a man; he reckons his neighbour as himself. But the man who thinks he is a chicken does not try to look through the man who thinks he is glass. The man who thinks himself Jesus Christ does not quarrel with the man who thinks himself Rockefeller; as would certainly happen if the two had ever met. But
madmen never meet. It is the only thing they cannot do. They can talk, they can inspire, they can fight, they can found religions; but they cannot meet. Maniacs can never be the majority; for the simple reason that they can never be even a minority. If two madmen had ever agreed they might have conquered the world.



(6) Don't say that the idea of human equality is absurd, because some men are tall and some short, some clever and some stupid. At the height of the French Revolution it was noticed that Danton was tall and Murat short. In the wildest popular excitement of America it is known that Rockefeller is stupid and that Bryan is clever. The doctrine of human equality reposes upon this: That there is no man really clever who has not found that he is stupid. That there is no big man who has not felt small. Some men never feel small; but these are the few men who are.

(7) Don't say (please don't say) that Primitive Man knocked down a woman with a club and carried her away. Why on earth should he? Does the male sparrow knock down the female sparrow with a twig? Does the male giraffe knock down the female giraffe with a palm tree? Why should the male have had to use any violence at any time in order to make the female a female? Why should the woman roll herself in the mire lower than the sow or the she-bear; and profess to have been a slave where all these creatures were creators; where all these beasts were gods? Do not talk such bosh. I implore you, I supplicate you not to talk such bosh. Utterly and absolutely abolish all such bosh--and we may yet begin to discuss these public questions properly.

The Animated Muck Heap

Chesterton passage in his essay "The Voter and the Two Voices". What a wonderful description of UK society, much of which still rings true today in Jersey (e.g. "top-heavy rich and its tortured poor")!

"It is calmly assumed that the only two possible types of society are a Collectivist type of society and the present society that exists at this moment and is rather like an animated muck-heap. It is quite unnecessary to say that I should prefer Socialism to the present state of things. I should prefer anarchism to the present state of things. But it is simply not the fact that Collectivism is the only other scheme for a more equal order. A Collectivist has a perfect right to think it the only sound scheme; but it is not the only plausible or possible scheme. We might have peasant proprietorship; we might have the compromise of Henry George; we might have a number of tiny communes; we might have co-operation; we might have Anarchist Communism; we might have a hundred things. I am not saying that any of these are right, though I cannot imagine that any of them could be worse than the present social madhouse, with its top-heavy rich and its tortured poor; but I say that it is an evidence of the stiff and narrow alternative offered to the civic mind, that the civic mind is not, generally speaking, conscious of these other possibilities. "


The Thing

One of the essays of Chesterton that I always remember for its start and finish is "The Thing". Actually, the body of the essay has a lot to say about democracy, the selling out of the older rural aristocracy to people with money (who buy titles, land, and the veneer of being old and traditional), and the tokenism of elections.

What he says about what might be called "upper" or "owning" class is interesting: "the vast estates into which England has long been divided are passing out of the hands of the English gentry into the hands of men who are always upstarts and often actually foreigners."; this is a recurrent observation, and our local example is probably the Dame of Sark, who gave the impression of having a long Feudal lineage, and Sark being a last Feudal bastion, whereas not only did the title and establishment of Sark only stem from a post-Feudal period (the re-colonisation of Sark by the de Carterets), but also the title was bought up by her family only a generation or two before when the original Seigneurs went bankrupt! Of course in Chesterton's England this went hand in hand with corruption, and landowners would buy peerages (especially but not only in the time of Lloyd George), send their children to public schools, and appear "establishment". This was so massive a change in Chesterton's time that he saw it as a kind of invasion, especially as some of the moneyed class were rich immigrants: "In theory the sale of a squire's land to a moneylender is a minor and exceptional necessity. In reality it is a thing like a German invasion. Sometimes it is a German invasion."

He then goes on to argue that what happens is that these people take over the countryside, and get into goverment, and basically do not allow local people a say in what goes on: "Upon this helpless populace, gazing at these prodigies and fates, comes round about every five years a thing called a General Election. It is believed by antiquarians to be the remains of some system of self-government; but it consists solely in asking the citizen questions about everything except what he understands." The net result of this is that the agenda for issues in an election is set by the rulers rather than the governed, and national and international issues predominate to the detriment of local issues, which are sidelined, the average man "would be, I seriously believe, the best judge of whether farmsteads or factory chimneys should adorn his own sky-line, of whether stupid squires or clever usurers should govern his own village. But these are precisely the things which the oligarchs will not allow him to touch with his finger. Instead, they allow him an Imperial destiny and divine mission to alter, under their guidance, all the things that he knows nothing about. The name of self-government is noisy everywhere: the Thing is throttled." Locally, that reminds me most recently of the last election but one when Frank Walker was elected largely on a platform of the politician with "international statue" and the only one with experience to negotiate with the U.K. Government, which formed a large plank in his campaign to be elected; in Jersey we are luckier in getting local issues raised, but note the recent idea of rezoning large units of Green Zone land was not ever an election issue, but something that has come up afterwards, along with the "redevelopment of St Helier" proposals. It is almost a case of burying them in the middle of a period between elections, so that no one can comment on them!

But the central image I remember is that of the wind, at the start:

"The wind awoke last night with so noble a violence that it was like the war in heaven; and I thought for a moment that the Thing had broken free. For wind never seems like empty air. Wind always sounds full and physical, like the big body of something; and I fancied that the Thing itself was walking gigantic along the great roads between the forests of beech."

He returns to this right at the end as well, after discussing the magnates who have taken away self-governent in any meaningful sense:

"The wind sang and split the sky like thunder all the night through; in scraps of sleep it filled my dreams with the divine discordances of martyrdom and revolt; I heard the horn of Roland and the drums of Napoleon and all the tongues of terror with which the Thing has gone forth: the spirit of our race alive. But when I came down in the morning only a branch or two was broken off the tree in my garden; and none of the great country houses in the neighbourhood were blown down, as would have happened if the Thing had really been abroad."


Thursday, 17 May 2007

Dawkin's and Domestic Bliss

Just been reading Michael Ruse, Evolutionary Naturalism: Selected Essays (1995). A few random jottings:

An interesting way of looking at Gould vs Dawkins/Pinker

To talk in terms of metaphor, one set of evolutionists (the Darwinians, the synthetic theorists) regards the organic world in terms of adaptation, which is to say as though it is functioning or designed. The other set of evolutionists, of which Gould is a prime representative, does not. They think of the organic world in terms of form, which means that there are certain basic structures or blueprints according to which organisms are constructed.

Dawkins / Maynard Smith

It is just not the case that the anti-adaptationist movement epitomized by punctuated equilibria has come up with stunning new findings (as in the physics case of super-conductivity) or new models (as with Hamilton)-findings and models which simply compel discussion and agreement. Much of the discussion has been rhetorical and/or philosophical in some broad sense. I ask it also since some people-English adaptationists, in particular - seem not merely to be unreceptive to the attack on adaptation, but incapable of seeing even that there is the slightest force to the attack. (If you do not know what I mean, look at Richard Dawkins' The Blind Watchmaker.) For them-intelligent, hard-working, good-quality evolutionists-punctuated equilibria and all that it represents is not so much false but simply time-wasting gobbledegook (see also Maynard Smith 1981).

Dawkins Hidden Prejudices

Evolutionary biology has been used to carry horrible beliefs, and these have been promoted in the name of Darwinism as well as alternative evolutionary theories. Moreover, I would agree that this is a legacy which persists. If we jump to the present, or at least to the immediately past present, we find similar sorts of values alive and well there also. I am certainly not saying that people today are open racists in quite the way that someone like Darwin would be if he were writing today. At least, I am certainly not saying that the bulk of respected evolutionists wear their prejudices in quite the open way that one finds among the Victorians, although around the fringes one can certainly find such thinkers.

Yet I would say that even among the respected and respectable, the sentiments are often unchanged. Consider, for example, Richard Dawkins' well-known book, The Selfish Gene (1976). In talking about the sexual strategies open to females in the course of reproduction, he distinguishes the 'he man' strategy from the 'domestic bliss' strategy. Without commenting on the full extent to which Dawkins is pointing to real aspects of the living world, it surely requires little argument to see that his use of these terms is insulting to women. I for one would not like to be a member of the sex whose options apparently are either attracting Tarzan or staying home with the kids.

Spinning Labour's Future

Extremely funny read by Simon Hoggart in the Guardian. I have really no idea who Alan Johnson is, but it is a marvellous depiction of him, and very amusing!


Real human takes joystick


Simon Hoggart
Wednesday May 16, 2007
The Guardian


Alan Johnson launched his campaign for deputy leader of the Labour party yesterday. He is running as a real human being - always a high-risk gamble for a politician. The event was held in the Methodist Central Hall, Westminster. The Labour party famously owes more to Methodism than to Marx, and Mr Johnson has scant time for the German savant. He is no more a Marxist than Richard Dawkins is a Scientologist.
 
He had a claque. Every politician seems to have one now. They are bright, shiny, eager-looking persons, mostly young, the men wearing suits and ties. They applaud everything their candidate says, for slightly too long.

"Good morning," he says, "thank you for coming." "Yee-haw!" shouts the claque.

Mr Johnson's aides had distributed endorsements. One began with the most improbable statement I have seen for some time, even in politics: "We are a group of 53 Labour peers from all sections of the party and all walks of life."

Lords from all walks of life! How inclusive can you get?

The literature contained many pictures of Mr Johnson. In nearly all of them he had his mouth open, perhaps to depict good-humoured spontaneity but in fact making it look as if he is about to eat a cream bun, or flick out a foot-long tongue and catch flies.

His message is: we must keep the middle classes on board (translated here as "we have signalled our determination to build a coalition of aspirants as well as the disadvantaged") and at the same time support the unions. This is because the unions, as well as being a vital part of a modern and mature democracy, have a third of all the votes.

And he is backing Gordon Brown, which is lucky, because so far he hasn't got much choice. He read out an extract from his diary ("more Pooter than Samuel Pepys", he said - "film rights are available, Johnny Depp should play me") written in 1992 when he first met Gordon. "Could he be a future prime minister?" he had asked himself. "He knows his stuff!"

And here is the difference between the average political lickspittle and a genuine human: he realised we might imagine this was fiction, and added: "You can carbon date it if you like."

His other message is that, unlike the lawyers and consultants he is running against, he has done a real job. "I did stack shelves at Tesco - they sacked me at 16." He had also been a postman.

And he admits when he's got it all wrong. "We are on a long flight - we are having a bit of inflight refuelling, er, we are changing the pilot and the co-pilot, so, er, maybe this analogy doesn't work ... "

What, someone asked, about Lord Turnbull's charge that Gordon Brown was impossible to work with - a Stalinist? He had a cunning riposte. "Gordon is to Stalinism what Turnbull is to civil servants' discretion."

Someone asked if his campaign team were not all men in suits. "For those who believe the deputy leader should be a woman, there's not much I can do. The operation is very expensive and wouldn't be over by June 27."


Wednesday, 16 May 2007

Bird Watching and Discipleship

Extremely good talk by Rowan Williams on discipleship; I like his analogy of the bird-watcher. Here are a few extracts:

"The true disciple is an expectant person, always taking it for granted that there is something about to break through from the master, something about to burst through the ordinary and uncover a new light on the landscape. The master is going to speak or show something; reality is going to open up when you're in the master's company and so your awareness (as has often been said by people writing about contemplative prayer) is a little bit like that of a bird-watcher, the experienced bird-watcher, who is sitting still, poised, alert, not tense or fussy, knowing that this is the kind of place where something extraordinary suddenly bursts into view."

"I've always rather liked that image of prayer as bird-watching. You sit very still because something is liable to burst into view, and sometimes of course it means a long day sitting in the rain with nothing very much happening, and I suspect that most of us know that a lot of our experience of prayer is precisely that. But the odd occasions when you do see what T. S. Eliot called 'the kingfisher's wing flashing light to light' make it all worthwhile. And I think that living in expectancy - living in awareness, your eyes sufficiently open and your mind sufficiently both slack and attentive to see that when it happens - has a great deal to do with discipleship, indeed with discipleship as the gospels present it to us. Interesting (isn't it?) that in the gospels the disciples don't just listen, they're expected to look as well. They're people who are picking up clues all the way through. "

Rowan Williams

 

http://www.fulcrum-anglican.org.uk/events/2007/williams.cfm?doc=209

The Great Problem Solved

A lovely comic anecdote from G.K. Chesterton from his book "The Common Man".




An infinite number of years ago, when I was the chief weakness of a publisher's office, I remember that there was issued from that establishment a book of highly modern philosophy: a work of elaborate evolutionary explanation of everything and nothing... It was called "The Great Problem Solved" or some such title. When this book had been out for a few days it began to promise an entirely unexpected success. Booksellers sent to ask about it, travellers came in and asked for it, even the ordinary public stood in a sort of knot outside the door, and sent in their bolder spirits to make inquiries.

Even to the publisher this popularity seemed remarkable; to me (who had dipped into the work, when I should have been otherwise employed) it appeared utterly incredible.

After some little time, however, when they had examined "The Great Problem Solved", the lesser problem was also solved.


We found that people were buying it under the impression that it was a detective story. I do not blame them for their desire, and most certainly I do not blame them for their disappointment. It must have exasperated them, it would certainly infuriate me, to open a book expecting to find a cosy, kindly, human story about a murdered man found in a cupboard, and find instead a lot of dull, bad philosophy about the upward progress and the purer morality. I would rather read any detective book than that book. I would rather spend my time in finding out why a dead man was dead than in slowly comprehending why a certain philosopher had never been alive.

Flowers and Earwigs

Came across this is Chesterton's "Monsters and the Middle Ages", a robust attack on Frazer's Golden Bough.

The Similarity of Tales

The argument that myths tend to be alike, because there is a common source to them (Frazer's argument), is often an assumption brought to myths, not a deduction based on evidence.

"Poems and poetic tales tend to be a little alike, not because Hebrews were really Chaldeans, nor because Christians were really Pagans, but because men are really men. Because there is, in spite of all the trend of modern thought, such a thing as man and the brotherhood of men. Anyone who has really looked at the moon might have called the moon a virgin and a huntress without ever having heard of Diana. Anyone who had ever looked at the sun might call it the god of oracles and of healing without having heard of Apollo. A man in love, walking about in a garden, compares a woman to a flower, and not to an earwig; though an earwig also was made by God, and has many superiorities to flowers in point of education and travel. To hear some people talk, one would think that the love of flowers had been imposed by some long priestly tradition, and the love of earwigs forbidden by some fearful tribal taboo."

The fallacy of borrowing as a complete expanation

The second argument he tackes is that when there is borrowing, it is using it in the same way, rather than taking inspiration and a starting point with the stories. Frazer supposed that if there was borrowing of stories, this meant that they were taken across completely, and thought this discredited the borrower; what philosophers (and linguists) now call the "genetic fallacy".

"The second great blunder is to suppose that such fables, even when they really are borrowed from older sources, are used in an old tired and customary spirit....Thus, when professors tell us that the Christians "borrowed" this or that fable or monster from the heathens, it is as if people said that a bricklayer had "borrowed" his bricks from clay, or a chemist had "borrowed" his explosives from chemicals; or that the Gothic builders of Lincoln or Beauvais had "borrowed" the pointed arch from the thin lattices of the Moors."



Monday, 14 May 2007

The Dawkin's Dilemna

The Dawkin's Dilemna

What would you do?

You are on a deserted beach with a rifle, an elephant and a baby. This is the last elephant on earth and it is charging the baby. Do you shoot the elephant, knowing the species would become extinct?

This cropped up in last week's Observer (http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2078453,00.html)

"This was the dilemma Richard Dawkins put to me during a weekend in the country." said Cristina Odone.



You are on a deserted beach with a rifle, an elephant and a baby. This is the last elephant on earth and it is charging the baby. Do you shoot the elephant, knowing the species would become extinct?

This was the dilemma Richard Dawkins put to me during a weekend in the country. Our host, publisher Anthony Cheetham, had mischievously placed us next to each other at table. I thought the dilemma was a no-brainer - my only doubt was whether I would shoot straight enough to kill the beast.

He was outraged by my answer: man, beast, they were all the same to him and the priority must be to protect the endangered species. He berated me for my foolish belief in the specialness of humanity for its soul.

Dawkins's hatred of religion went on, as is well-known, to flower in television documentaries and, more recently, his bestselling The God Delusion. All faith is blind, rationality is anathema to believers and religion is the enemy of science: the tenets at the heart of the Dawkins dogma have been polished again and again and so widely transmitted that they have become common currency.

Dawkins is not the only world-famous apologist of secularist extremism. Christopher Hitchens is similarly critical of religion; so is Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the former Dutch MP who received death threats for her criticism of Islam. But Hitchens and Ali now operate primarily in America, a nation where 95 per cent of citizens believe in God and church attendance is growing, not dwindling. They can jab God and his followers, but theirs is only a faint note of discord, overwhelmed by the church choir.

In secular Britain, faith-bashing carries far more resonance and risks causing far greater damage. In this country, belief is a minority practice and believers a persecuted lot. The rabid attacks by Dawkins and his camp-followers spur even the most mild-mannered Christian, Muslim or Jew into a hard-line position.

But there is hope. In a recent interview, Dawkins describes a gigantic intelligence which designs the universe. He acknowledges that there may be an awe-inspiring and uplifting force out there and that he is prepared to encounter it. It sounds suspiciously like God under another name. Catholic schoolchildren used to pray for the conversion of England; nowadays, I'd settle for the conversion of Richard Dawkins.

For the only hope for tolerance is for him to publish a stream of new titles - The God Solution, The Selfless Gene - and address cosy church groups as an apostate who has seen the light. With their loudest persecutor silenced, believers would see no need for hard-line posturing. They would once again feel like ordinary citizens rather than a hunted species that must bare its fangs to survive.

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Friday, 4 May 2007

A dip into the dippy world of Doctor Who

A dip into the dippy world of Doctor Who! With a few comments.



This is the famous speech on parting from his granddaughter, Susan; he says: "One day I shall come back. Yes, I shall come back. Until then, there must be no regrets, no tears, no anxieties. Just go forward in all your beliefs, and prove to me that I am not mistaken in mine." (The Doctor, in "The Dalek Invasion of Earth")

One I like as it puts limits on science etc: "Logic, my dear Zoe, merely enables one to be wrong with authority."(The Doctor, in "The Wheel in Space"); something similar when he says: "The trouble with computers, of course, is that they're very sophisticated idiots."(The Doctor, in "Robot")

For those who know any politicians, this was good: "Look, try and use your intelligence, man, even if you are a politician." (The Doctor, in "Day of the Daleks"); staying in the political arena, I love "One has no wish to be devoured by alien monstrosities, even in the cause of political progress."(One of the Tribunal, in "Carnival of Monsters")

This was amusing about the nature of the mass of rubbish TV in general: "What are we going to do now?" "Keep it confused, feed it with useless information. I wonder if I have a television set handy?"(Sgt. Benton and the second Doctor, in "The Three Doctors")

A point to ponder: "Brigadier, a straight line may be the shortest distance between two points, but it is by no means the most interesting."(The Doctor, in "The Time Monster"); another comes with a nice touch of Buddhism in "When everything is new, can anything be a surprise?" (Cho-je, in "Planet of the Spiders")

One of my favourites! "There's no point in being grown-up if you can't be childish sometimes."(The Doctor, in "Robot")

Interesting moral dilemma: "Listen; if someone who knew the future pointed out a child to you, and told you that that child would grow up totally evil, to be a ruthless dictator who would destroy millions of lives, could you then kill that child?"(The Doctor, in "Genesis of the Daleks")

Give someone a fish ....

"You know that old saying, Give someone a fish and you feed them for a day; teach someone to fish and you feed them for life. Paul's whole motto seems to be that if you merely give someone a dogma, you may keep them on the straight and narrow for a day, but if you teach someone to think Christianly, they'll be able to be sustained, even when you're not around writing letters to them. And so a lot of Paul's letters are really helping people to grow up and think Christianly for themselves, because Paul knows there'll be many, many more issues that they have to face, that he won't have time to write letters to them about. But if they will actually learn to think Christian, if they can do it for themselves." (Tom Wright)

http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/rn/relig/spirit/stories/s1604323.htm