Election Guesses and Voting Strategy

Election Guesses and Voting Strategy

I’d put the front runners – so far – for St Helier No 3/4- in alphabetical order, as:

John Baker
Lyndsay Feltham
Inna Gardiner.

At this stage I would say it is too early to tell. I'm hoping Matthew Price will do lunchtime sessions as in May on BBC Radio Jersey to allow the candidates to all be quizzed in depth. It was far better than the sound bite shortness of the Senatorial hustings - and this is approaching that in numbers standing.

People have pointed out Ant Lewis standing in the Senatorials – he came 4th in St Helier ¾ apparently, but I remain unconvinced.

I voted for Ant Lewis because he got my “spare vote", in the Senatorial elections, where there were multiple candidates to select, and I'd sooner give him a chance than some of those I didn't want to get in. Giving one vote out of eight is very different from a bi-election where there is just one vote and one place and no single transferrable vote either - which would also have helped him, I'm sure.

An American study in Political Science ("Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts: Approval Voting in Practice?") examined how multi-member constituencies work, looking at a simple case of 3 candidates for 2 seats, but the same kind of principles apply to larger ones, for instance, Senators, or indeed the general election for St Helier 3/4:

"It should be noted at this point that the double election with three candidates is almost identical to what might be called negative approval voting. Under this latter system, each voter would vote against as many candidates as he or she wished, with the candidate receiving the most of these negative votes being chosen to remain out of public life."

"In other words, instead of viewing the double election as the selection of two MPs, one can view it as the selection of one private citizen, in which case it is essentially equivalent to approval voting. For, the options facing a voter in the negative approval scheme are essentially the same as those facing the voter in the double election"

And they give several examples - here is one:

"Suppose first that the elector is certain that candidate 1 will win one of the seats regardless of how he (the elector) votes. Given this expectation, the contest is essentially reduced to a two-candidate race for the remaining seat. The only possible effect of a vote for 2, given the voter's beliefs, is to defeat 3. Hence, since defeating 3 is desirable, if there is any chance that the vote will be decisive, the voter will cast a {1, 2} ballot"

You could see this if it was 2 seats available, and Jackie Hilton, Ant Lewis and Nick Le Cornu standing. Jacqui would be a dead cert to get votes, but Ant would pick up votes as well for very different reasons (and I'm referring to that calamitous tweet by Nick which still causes ripples!) Incidentally, this was played out a few years back at the St Lawrence election with John le Fondré, Eddie Noel, and I think Nick Palmer - Eddie said, please vote for John, and give me your second vote - a direct attempt to target strategy.

Another pre-condition for this kind of strategic behaviour is where voters "vote for the man (or woman)" and it is here that strategic behaviour may be important - strongly entrenched party politics upsets this balance.

And that's why I voted for Ant Lewis in the Senatorials, and why I would not vote for him in the single candidate bi-election. Whether my strategy is mirrored by others is a moot point, but the research by the Americans - looking at USA and UK - suggests that strategic behaviour is more likely to play a significant role in Multi-Member Districts, and so not this time round.

I don't think he'll do badly as some, but not as well as might be thought.

References

"Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts: Approval Voting in Practice?" by  Gary W. Cox,  American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4